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Humans vs. objects

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[just a short note from around May 20, 2014]

A person, we tend to say, is not simply an object. Each of us would be at least inclined to say about herself or himself “I am not just an object”.

What are we trying to say in such a case?

First, let me think of what we are not trying to say. We are not trying to say that we are not material beings. Some people might want to say that too, but that case would be different. After all, when I say that I am not an object I also want to reject the idea that I might be an immaterial object (but an object nevertheless).

I could accept the thought that I am a being, though, but then I would take ‘being’ and ‘object’ as contrary terms. In any case, my materiality or immateriality does not seem to be in focus here. Such things might only matter if one would show me that conceiving myself as something else than an object is incompatible with conceiving myself as a material being.

Leaving this aside, I think it should also be clear that I am not trying to say that I am not an artifact. It doesn’t seem inconceivable that something which is not an object, but a person would be, in a sense, produced by an author. (Also, one might call “author” the person responsible for a body of work – as Cage is responsible for the sounds coming from street, which become a part of his concert when he opens a window).

Similar conceptibility arguments could be devised to deny that the person saying “I am not an object” wants to think of herself not only as an immaterial and nonartifactual being, but also as a “really free agent”, “fully rational creature”, “alive”, “sentient”, “truly conscious” etc.

One could agree to having no mind (in any philosophical sense) and still say “I am not an object.”

The latter Wittgenstein would perhaps suggest at this point that we should think of real life situations in which one would actually say this.

The first thing which comes to mind would be that one might say this in order to object to a way in which one was treated (think of a teacher saying “I am not a broken record” to her students).

There are, of course, cases in which we accept being treated as objects (at some point of our interaction with a medical doctor, for instance). Couldn’t we imagine a person saying that she is not an object without the intention to protest to the way she was treated in such a circumstance? And if we can, what would such a person try to say?

Suppose I am old and sick and a caretaker washes me and I think to myself “Still, I am not an object.” I do agree to the treatment I am receiving and I am not affected by the thought that the caretaker could be washing me as if she was washing an object. I can even imagine that the caretaker would never speak to me or treat me in a way different from the one in which people treat objects. This does not prevent me from thinking that I wouldn’t be affected, in a sense.

Suppose everybody in the world would act in my presence as if I was an object. Suppose, in addition, that I wouldn’t feel the urge to complain (a reason for this could be provided by the idea, which I could have developed over time, in this scenario, that I would deserve such a treatment anyway). Now suppose that I tell myself at some point in this scenario that I am not an object, not from some philosophical inclination, but as something one would spontaneously say.

What would I be doing in this case? My only reply is that I would reaffirm my commitment to assuming responsibility for my actions (and perhaps for more than my own actions – this is, however, a different topic).

Is this a personal thing? I seem to be willing to conceive cases in which I would continue to say that I am not an object while giving up a lot of other claims (another example: suppose some strange beings provide me with overwhelming evidence that I actually am a robot; they show me that my conscience is simulated and, as such, what I appear to be experiencing is less than a pale shadow of what it means for a real being to be conscious etc.; I accept that I am a robot and still… ). Other people might be unable to accept my scenarios but perfectly able to think of a case in which they would give up on assuming any responsibility for what they were doing and still think of themselves as “not just objects”. Isn’t this just a battle of different intuitions?

My point in saying that I am not an object, however, is not to say that I am an inherently moral being. Being responsible for an action cannot be separated from performing an action. In this sense, “I did A” and “I am responsible for A” are linked. One might not hold oneself morally responsible for what one assumes responsibility for doing.

Being committed to assume responsibility, in this sense, is simply being committed to act (or, in other words, to regard what you do as an action). If I only thought of what I do as “just behavior” all the time, if I thought of me only in terms of the properties I have, obtain and loose, or in terms of the processes I take part in, I wouldn’t say that I am not an object anymore.

Saying that I am not an object is to say that I refuse to talk about myself only as something “located in the world” (this is a very bad way of putting it). I act in the world. From this point of view, there is no Cartesian gap between me (or my mind) and the world. The starting point of my actions, however, must be “outside the world” (this, now, is the worst way of putting it). I am that starting point. I act. This, perhaps, is the shortest way in which I could express the thought that I am not an object.

One could still reply that this idea grows from the culture and the times I am living in. Such a person could perhaps imagine a future in which nobody would frown at the thought that objects can also perform actions (in a sense). That would be, in my view, a culture in which the distinction between persons and objects would have faded away. Accordingly, saying either that you are not an object, or that you are an object would not make sense anymore in such times, so I wouldn’t worry too much about this.

Post-humans could stop distinguishing themselves from objects. The point I am trying to make is that if they did so, they would also give up to our concept of action and to seeing themselves as persons (at least in the way in which we see ourselves as persons who contain in themselves the possibility of acting).

Finally, I think the reproach that in order to clarify something (“I am not an object” I am using equally unclear concepts (“non-moral responsibility”, “action”, “person”) is misplaced here. My aim was not to clarify, but rather to illuminate a thought, by taking a look at its neighbors.


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